 1 Biology and Teleology in Aristotle's Account of the City* Mariska Leunissen TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill  INTRODUCTION  AfamousprobleminthescholarshiponAristotle'sPoliticapertainstothenatureof thecity:isthehighestformofpoliticalcommunityaproductofnatureorofart?The evidence isnotoriouslyambiguous.1Inchapter twoofthefirstbookofthePolitica, Aristotle explains how the city develops naturally out of more scattered and agriculturalwaysofliving,andcomparesthecitytoanorganicwhole,suggestingthat the city is a natural entity. However, Aristotle also praises the person 'who first established' the city (Pol 1.2.1253a30-31) and later compares this lawgiver to a craftsman,2 giving evidence for the artificialness of the city and the importance of humanpracticalreasoninitsconstruction. MyaiminthispaperistopresentaninterpretationofAristotle'saccountof thecity that accommodates both perspectives. I argue that the city is a productof natural generation and of the artificial process of lawgiving, but that the two processespertaintodifferent levelsoforganizationofthecity: thefirstpertainsto whatIcallthe'naturalcity'andthesecondpertainstothe'ethicalcity'. Theargumentproceedsintwoparts.First,IarguethatAristotle'suseinhis Politica ofteleologicalprinciples–whichbelongproperly tothescienceofnature– indicates that it is a hybrid treatise, being part natural science and part political science(justashisDe Anima ispartnaturalscienceandpartmetaphysics).3Natural sciencepertainstothehumanbeingswhopossessanaturaldrivetowardsforming ever more complex communities for the sake of living, that is, for the sake of satisfyingthebiologicalneedsofallhumans involved.Theoutcomeofthisnatural   *Successivelymoredevelopedpartsandversionsofthispaperwerepresentedatthe5thPenn-Leiden ColloquiuminAncientvalueson'valuingOthers'(LeidenUniversity,June2008);theWorkshopon DelimitingAristotle'sScienceofNature(UniversityofPittsburgh,November2008;theWorkshopon Bridging the Gap between Aristotle's Science and Ethics (University of Western Ontario, March 2009);attheconferenceonTeleologyintheAncientWorld(ExeterUniversity,July2009);andatthe 33rdAncientPhilosophyWorkshop(UniversityofTexasatAustin,March2010).Iamgratefultothe audiencesontheseoccasions(andespeciallytomycommentatorLarryJostattheAncientPhilosophy Workshop)fortheirquestionsandtheirencouragementtodevelopmyideasfurther. 1 For instance, Keyt 1991: 118 refers to this problem as 'a blunder at the very root of Aristotle's politicalphilosophy.'SeealsoKraut2002:240-6,Mayhew1997:325-6andReeve2009:513-8. 2SeePol 2.8.1268b34-8;2.12.1273b30-3,1274b18-19;and7.4.1325b39-1326a5. 3On thehybridnatureof thePolitica, cf.Kullmann1991:104and114,whodifferentiatesbetween 'political'statementsand'biological'statementsthatarebeing'adoptedinthescientifictreatmentof politics,'butconcludesthat 'biologyservesmerelyasan'analogicalmodel'...forthepolis,andthe comparisonshaveapurelyheuristicfunction.'OnthehybridnatureofDe Anima,cf.Lennox1999:24;13and2006:310;VanderEijk1997:233-235.  2 teleologicalprocessisthenaturalcity.Itakeitthatthisnaturalcityisthenusedbythe lawgiver as his material for the sake of producing a city that enables free male citizensto livewell–thatis,tolivevirtuousandhappylives.Thisistheethicalcity, anditconstitutestheproperobjectofpoliticalscience. Next,Ishowthatthedifferentgoalsservedbythebiologicalandethicalcity, andthedifferentcausalmechanismsbywhichtheycometobeorexistresemblethe patternsofteleologicalexplanationinAristotle'sbiologicalworks.Thenaturalcityis similar tootherbiologicalfeaturesthatarenecessary for livingandwhicharealways a realizationofapre-existingpotentialforform–aprocessthatIrefertoas'primary teleology'. The ethical city, however, is similar to those biological features that are notstrictlyspeakingnecessaryforliving,butarerather'for the better' andaresaidtobe forthesakeofliving well. Suchfeaturesaretheresultofgoal-directedagentsmaking use of what is already available for something good – a process that I refer to as 'secondaryteleology'.4 Under this interpretation, Aristotle's use of nature and natural teleology in thePolitica isthusnotacategorymistakeashasbeensuggested:5thereareaspectsof thecitythatbelonggenuinelytothescienceofnature.  SCIENCEOFNATUREINARISTOTLE'SPOLITICA  Aristotle explicitly characterizes his investigations in theEthica Nicomachea and the Politica as part of one and the same science,namely political science (see, e.g.,EN 1.2.1094a26-b7 and 10.9). This political science is defined as the study of how to makecitizens'goodandcapableoffinedeeds'(see,e.g.,EN 1.9.1099b29-32andPol 7.13.1332a7-38). Whereas the Ethica Nicomachea focuses on virtue, i.e., on what constitutes a good state of character, and works predominantly at the level of individual human beings, the Politica operates at the level of the highest form of human community, and offers an investigation of the city and of particular constitutions as the means by which politicians make citizens good. Both provide politicalknowledge,whichisthe'mostauthoritativeandmostarchitectonic'formof knowledge(EN 1.2.1094a26-b7)andbelong–accordingtoAristotle'scategorization of the sciences in theMetaphysica (Meta 6.1 and 11.7) – to the branch of practical sciences. Althoughpoliticalscience is thusclearlyseparatedofffromnaturalscience, which is a theoretical science, Aristotle's Politica nevertheless contains at least three biological features that appear to belong more properly to a treatise engaged in naturalscience.ThefirstandmostproblematicofthesefeaturesisAristotle'squasietiological account (inPol 1.2) of the natural development of cities, characterizing   4Mycharacterizationof'primaryteleology'buildsonGotthelf's1987interpretationofteleology.The characterizationof'secondaryteleology'inthispaperbuildsonmaterialsIhavedevelopedelsewhere (Leunissen,2010a&2010b). 5See,e.g.,Lloyd1996:185;202-4.  3 themasanatureandendofhumancommunalrelations.Accordingtothisaccount, thefirststageofthedevelopmentconsistsintheformationofcouplesbetweenmale andfemaleforthesakeofsexualreproduction,andbetweenrulerandruledforthe sakeofpreservation(Pol 1.2.1252a26-30).Fromthesetwocommunities thenarises thehousehold,which isputtogetherforthesupplyofdailyneeds(Pol 1.2.1252b915).Next,whenseveralhouseholdsareunited,avillagecomestobeforthesakeof non-daily needs (Pol 1.2.1252b15-16). And finally, the city comes into being (Pol 1.2.1252b27-1253a4):  Thecompletecommunityfrommultiplevillagesisthecity,whichhasalready reachedthe limitof total self-sufficiency so to say, and which comestobe for the sake of living, but exists for the sake of living well. Thereforeeach cityisbynature,ifindeedalsothefirstcommunitiesare.Foritistheirend, andnatureisanend:forwhateachthingiswhenitsgenerationiscompleted thatiswhatwecallitsnature,justasofaman,ahorse,ahouse.Inaddition, that for the sake of which andtheend are the best.And self-sufficiency is bothanendandbest.Fromthese[arguments]itisclearthenthatthecityis amongthethingsthatarebynature(ὅτιτῶνφύσειἡπόλιςἐστί),andthatman isbynatureapoliticalanimal,andthathewhoiswithoutacitybynatureand notbyluckiseitherbadormorethanhuman.  Aristotlethuspresentsthecityassomethingthatgrowsorganicallyoutoflower-level communitiesforthesakeofliving–thussatisfyingthetendenciesandneedshumans have by nature: humans instinctively (and notby choice:Pol 1.2.1252a28-30) strive towardsself-preservationandreproduction,andtendtolivetogetherandco-operate insecuringthesegoals,evenwhentheyarenot inneedofanything(this iswhat it means to be political: HA 1.1.487b33-488a13, EN 9.9.1169b16-19 and Pol 3.6.1278b15-21). In addition, the smallest elements of the city (Pol 1.1.1252a18-23) turnouttobe itsconditionallynecessaryparts (cf.Pol 1.2.1252a24-26):even ifone findsAristotle'shistoricalaccountofthegenesisofcitiesnottobeterriblycompelling, thebiologicalovertonesareundeniablypresent. The city's developmental account is followed by two other arguments, exemplifyingthesecondandthirdbiologicalfeature.ThesecondoccursinAristotle's argumentthathumanbeingsaremore politicalthananyotherpoliticalanimal,onthe grounds that we alone have the faculty of speech and thus possess the unique capabilitytocommunicatemoralconcepts(Pol 1.2.1253a8-18).Thisargumentbuilds ontheprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvain(thethoughtbeingthatifithadn't beenforourpoliticalnature,ourabilitytospeakwouldhavebeeninvain),which– asAristotleindicateselsewhere–isanempiricalhypothesisthatbelongsproperlyto thescienceofnatureandnottothescienceofpolitics(IA 2.704b12-705a2):   4 The starting point of our investigation is achieved by positing [principles] that we are accustomed constantly to use for our science of nature (πρὸς τὴν μέθοδοντὴνφυσικήν),assumingthatthisisthewayinwhichthingsareinall the works of nature. One of these is that nature does nothing in vain, but always, giventhepossibilities,doeswhat isbestforthesubstantialbeingof eachkindofanimal;therefore,ifitisbetterinacertainway,thatisalsohow itisbynature.(...).(Cf.GA 5.8.788b20-5.)  TheuseoftheprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvaininthePolitica issurprising, given that Aristotle typically prohibits the transfer (or metabasis) of scientific principlesfromone(unrelated)sciencetoanother(APo 1.7.75a38-b6).However,its occurrence here does not seem to be an accidental slip, as Aristotle applies it two more times in the Politica: first, in the establishment of war as a natural art of acquisition (inPol 1.8.1256b15-22) and later, in the characterizationof 'love of the self' as a feeling in human beings that is implanted by nature, which explains why humansvalueprivateproperty(inPol 2.5.1263a38-b3).Infact,thereareseveralmore passages inthePolitica inwhichAristotleappliesprinciplesormethodsthatbelong properly tothenatural sciences tohis analysis of (aspects of) the city.6 The use of teleologicalprinciplesandnaturalmethodsinthePolitica isthusquitepervasive. The third biological feature occurs in Aristotle's next argument, which establishesthecity'snaturalprioritytothefamilyandthe individualontheground thatawhole isnecessarilypriorto itspart(Pol I2,1253a18-20).Aristotlesupports this claim by drawing an analogy with natural bodies and their parts (destroy the body,andahandwillbeahandinnameonly,sinceitisnolongerabletoperformits function), thus conceptualizing the city as an organism, and citizens as its instruments(Pol 1.2.1253a20-6):  For once the whole is destroyed there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, in the same way one would speak about [a foot or hand] made of stone (for when destroyed it is just like that), and everything is definedby itsfunctionandcapacity,suchthatonemustno longersaythat suchthingsarethesameexceptbyhomonymy.Soitisclearthatthecityis bothbynatureandpriortoeachofus.    6For instance, inPol 1.2.1252b1-5,Aristotlereferstotheprinciplethat 'naturepreferstomakeone thing foronepurpose' inexplainingwhyhumanbeingsare sexuallydifferentiated,which is afairly common principle in his biological works (see, e.g., PA 2.16.659a20-2 and 5.6.683a19-25; GA 1.1.716a24-7).InPol 4.4.1290b23-1291b1,Aristotleclaimsthatthemethodofdetermininghowmany speciesofanimalstherearebyanalyzingtheirnecessarypartsandthepossiblecombinationsthereof isthesameastheoneneededtodeterminehowmanyspeciesofcitiesthereare(cf.Pol 3.4.1277a5-10). InPol 5.3.1302b33-1303a2,5.9.1309b18-35and7.4.1326a35-b2Aristotleimpliesthatthesamelawsof proportionapplytobothanimals(andtheirparts)andcities.  5 The analogy raises a number of interpretational problems, the most pressing of whichisthequestionwhetherAristotlebelievesthatcities,notjustarebynature,but also have a nature. That is, for something to qualify as a true natural entity for Aristotle,itnotonlyneedstobeanatureinthesenseofbeingafinalcause(foreven non-naturalentitiescanbeanatureinthatsense:seetheexampleofahouseinPol 1.2.1252b34), but it also needs to have a nature in the sense of having an internal principleofmotionandrest(i.e.,haveaninternalefficientcause)throughwhichits pre-existingpotentialforformisrealized.Ifcitiesturnouttohavetheirowninternal efficientcauseandtheirownformthattranscendstheformsoftheindividualhuman beings of which they are composed(inother words, if Aristotle's analogy between citiesandorganisms is toobiological), thatwould implythatAristotleultimatelydoes away with the ontological independence of 'ordinary' substantial beings such as individual humans. It would also extendthe scopeof natural teleology to an interspecies or perhaps even cosmic level.7 And finally, it would contradict Aristotle's immediatelyfollowingappraisalof'thepersonwhofirstputit[i.e.thecity]together (ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας)' as responsible for one of the greatest goods (Pol 1.2.1253a29-31),whichsuggeststhatpoliticiansarelikecraftsmen,andthatcitiesare productsofart.Thisartificialmodelof thecity is alsoendorsed inthe laterbooks (cf.note2above).Therethepolitician ischaracterizedasoperatingastheexternal efficientcause whocrafts lawsandconstitutions(theexternalformalcausesofthe city;cf.Pol 3.1.1274b38and3.3.1276b1-13),imposestheselawsandconstitutionson abodyofcitizens(thecity'smaterialcause;cf.Pol 7.4.1325b37-1326a8),andthereby creates the city. Given these problems, scholars have sometimes suggested that Aristotle'scharacterizationofthecityasnaturalmustbefalse,orthatitisonlymeant to be read metaphorically,8 but the biological language is too strong to be just explainedaway.  Before offering an alternative solution to these problems, let me explain why we should take the biological features seriously as belonging to Aristotle's study of nature,herecarriedoutinthecontextofthePolitica,whichwouldthusbeahybrid treatise. The clearest indication that Aristotle is conducting natural science in the Politica liesinhisuseoftheteleologicalprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvain.As indicated above, all teleological principles belong properly and exclusively to the science of nature (see IA 2.704b12-705a2, quoted above).9 The principles are empirical hypotheses about the goal-directed actions of formal natures in the productionofanimals(cf.GA 5.8.788b20-25andResp10.476a13):seeingthatnature for the most part produces functional parts we may posit this to be a general rule   7Sedley1991;Wardy1993:24-26. 8SeerespectivelyKeyt1991andKullmann1991:96-101. 9Onthescientificstatusofteleologicalprinciples,seeLennox2001:205-23.Formyinterpretationof teleologicalprinciplesasheuristictools,seechapterfourofLeunissen(2010a).  6 applyingtoalltheworksofnature,thatis,wepositthatnatureneverproducesparts in vain. Aristotle frequently appeals to these 'general rules' or principles in his biological treatises in cases where the causes of a given explanandum are not immediately discernible, for instance, because the explanandum pertains to the absenceofapartortothepresenceoftwoparts thatarebothassociatedwiththe performanceofthesamefunction.Bythinkingofsuchexplanandaasbeingacaseof nature'notdoinganythinginvain'orofnature'alwaysdoingsomethingbecauseitis either necessary or better' (and thus by engaging in a kind of thought experiment where we picture nature as a goal-directed designer of the animal in question), we might be able to discover for what reason nature acted this way in this particular case.10 I contend that Aristotle's use of teleological principles in the context of the Politicasuggestsatleastasimilarsearchforthediscoveryofnaturalcauses.11 Inaddition,totheextentthattheuseofteleologicalprinciplesinthePolitica actuallyexhibitsthenaturalcausesofcertainphenomena(thatis,totheextentthat the use of these principles is successful in generating natural explanations), those phenomena must be assumed to belong properly to the science of nature. Since teleologicalprinciplescannotpromptthediscoveryofnaturalcausesofthingsthat arenottheresultofthegoal-directedactionsofformalnatures,theyindirectlyalso functionasmarkersoftheboundariesofthescienceofnature. Aristotle's use of teleological principles in the De Caelo provides an illuminating parallel for their double function in helping to generate natural explanationsandtherebylayingbeartheboundariesofthescienceofnature.12 Inthis treatise,Aristotletriestoestablishthestudyoftheheavenlybodiesasagenuinepart ofthescienceofnature,therebyopposingsomeofhispredecessors,whotendedto treatastrologia asamathematicalscience.However,heishinderedinthisattemptby the fact that the heavenly domain is empirically underdetermined, which makes it verydifficulttoprovidecausalexplanationsoftheheavenlymotionsandattributes. Infact, thewholetreatise–eventhough it isexplicitly introducedasbeingpartof   10 For instance, in order to discover why snakes have no feet (which Aristotle considers to be a paradoxicalabsenceofparts,giventhatsnakesarebloodedland-dwellersandallotheranimalsofthis widerkinddohavefeet),Aristotlepositstheprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvainandengagesin athoughtexperiment inwhichthenowabsentpartsare imaginedtobepresent(IA 8.708a9-20;cf. PA 4.13.696a10-15).Thismentalpictureofthesnakeimmediatelyrevealsforwhatreasonnaturedid notproducefourfeetintheanimal:given the disproportionate dimensions of the snake's body,havingonlytwo pairsoffeetsetadistancefromeachother(naturecannotgivethesnakemorethanfourfeet,because thatwouldviolateitssubstantialbeingasabloodedanimal)wouldnotallowthesnaketobeableto moveswiftlyat all.Sincenaturedoesnothing invain, it removed theparts from the snake (cf.PA 4.11.691a27-b4andCael2.8.290a29-35). 11AcrudesearchintheTLGshowsfifteenoccurrencesoftheprinciplethatnaturedoesnothingin vaininthebiologicalworks(IfoundfiveinPA;sixinGA;threeinIA;andoneinResp.);oneinthe Physics;fourinDe Caelo;andtwoinDe Anima. Theprincipleisneverusedoutsidethenaturaltreatises, exceptforthethreeoccurrencesinthePolitica.  12OnAristotle'suseofteleologicalprinciplesinDe Caelo,seeLeunissen2009andchapterfiveofmy 2010a.  7 thescienceofnature(Cael 1.1.268a1:Ἡπερὶφύσεωςἐπιστήμη;cf.Cael3.1.298b2-3 andMeteor 1.1.338a20-5)–containsonlysevenfull-fledgedphysicalexplanationsof heavenly phenomena, all of which are generated through the application of teleologicalprinciples.13Theprinciplethatnaturedoesnothing invain is usedfour times in this treatise, each time for the discovery of the causes of absences of heavenly phenomena. Aristotle points out that the teleological explanations he ultimatelyprovidesarenotasnecessaryastheonesprovidedinthebiologicalworks, but he insists that they are at least 'plausible' or 'reasonable'.14 Given the lack of empirical evidence about heavenly phenomena, these explanations are the best physicalexplanationshecanpossiblyprovide,andbyprovidingthem,Aristotleisable toincorporatethestudyoftheheavensintothescienceofnature.  Aristotle'suseoftheteleologicalprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvainin thePolitica hasasimilardoublefunction:iftheiruseissuccessful,theyhelpidentify thenaturalcausesofagivenexplanandumand therebyexhibitthatexplanandumto beaproperobjectofthescienceofnature.Inallthreeapplicationsoftheprinciple inthePolitica,thiscanbeseentobethecase.Inthefirstexample,inPol 1.2.1253a718, the principle is used to find the explanation of why human beings are more politicalthanotherpoliticalanimals.Thecauseforthisdifferentiationturnsouttobe a feature that belongs to the substantial being of (and is thus natural to) human beings, but that is absent in the other political animals: whereas other political animalsonlyhavethecapacityforvoice,humanbeingshavetheuniquecapacityfor speech.15 Aristotle reasons that, sincenature doesnothing in vain, this capacity for speechmustbeforthesakeofsomethingandenablehumansbeingstoliveakindof political life that is different from those who merely possess voice (imagine the presenceofspeech innon-politicalhumans,or imaginepoliticalanimalswithvoice livingthesamekindofcommunallifeashumansdo:inbothcases,thepresenceof speech in humans would be in vain). The purpose of speech in this context is identifiedasthecommunicationofmoralconcepts,anditisthisabilitythatmakesus more political thananyotherpoliticalspecies.16Granted, theteleologicalprinciple is notusedhereasitisinthebiologicalworksinordertofindthecauseoftheabsence of a part (its use for finding the cause of the presence of something is however attestedintheDe Anima:see,e.g.,DA3.12.434a30-b8),buttheexplanationityields picks out anatural cause pertainingto thenatureof humanbeings. Thetwo other   13 SeeCael. 1.4.271a22-33, 2.3.286a7-9, 2.5.288a2-12, 2.8.290a29-35, 2.9.291a23-25, 2.11.291b10-15 and2.12.292a15-b25. 14SeeAristotle'smethodologicalstatementsprecedinghisteleologicalexplanationsinCael 2.3.286a37,2.5.287b29-288a2,2.12.291b24-8and2.12.292a14-18;cf.Meteor 1.7.344a5-7. 15Onthespectrumofthemoreandthelesspoliticallivesamonganimals,seeDepew1995:161ffand Cooper1990:360n6. 16Cf.Depew1995:179:'Inthematterofmakingaliving,reasonandarticulatespeech(logos)bestowa flexibility,creativity,anddiversityonhumanbioi thatisabsentfromthelivesofotheranimals.'Pace Keyt1991:123whoclams that 'manis apolitical animal toagreaterdegree thananyotheranimal sincemanistheonlyanimaltoformapolis.'  8 applicationsoftheprincipleinthePolitica equallyidentifynaturalfeaturesofhumans asthecausestobepickedoutintheexplanation:inPol 1.8.1256b15-22theprinciple pointstoahuman'sneedfoodafterbirth,whichexplainswhynaturesuppliesinthis needbyprovidinganimalsforconsumptionand,byextension,whycertainformsof war are natural and just. InPol 2.5.1263a38-b3, the principle points to the natural love of self humans have, which explains why they enjoy private possessions, and thus why citizens of the perfect state should not have all their possessions in commonasPlatoenvisagedintheRepublica.  Itissignificantboththattheobjectsofnaturalsciencethatareexhibitedthroughthe application of teleological principles in the Politica are human beings and the attributes they have by nature, and that these attributes subsequently inform what kindofactionsAristotlebelievesthelawgiveroughtoroughtnottoperform(certain formsofwararegood,andsoisallowingcitizenstohaveacertainamountofprivate possessions).Inthisway,politicalsciencebuildsonresultsofnaturalscience,atleast insofarasthelatterrevealsattributesofhumansthatalawgiverneedstotakeinto accountifheistoproduceasuccessful,well-functioningcity.Aristotlehintsatthis relationship of dependence between political and natural science in the following passage(Pol 1.10.1258a21-4):  Forjustaspoliticalsciencedoesnotmakehumans,butreceivesthemfrom nature and uses them (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς), so too is it necessary that nature providesearthandseaandwhateverelseforfood.  Political sciencemakes use of the humans it receives from nature and in that sense supervenes on natural science. It is not the task of political scientists to make humans,buttomakethemgood,and inordertodothisheneedstomakeuseof andperfecttheirnaturalpropensities(Pol 7.4.1325b39-1326a5):  Iamtalking,for instance,aboutaquantityofcitizensand land.For justas for other craftsmen, such as the weaver or shipbuilder, it is necessary that somematerialisavailablethatisfittingforthefunction(fortotheextentthat it turns out to be better prepared, the thing that comes to be by art will necessarily also be better), in the same way also is it necessary for the politician and the lawgiver that material is available that is suitable, being fittinglydisposed(οὕτωκαὶτῷπολιτικῷκαὶτῷνομοθέτῃδεῖτὴνοἰκείανὕλην ὑπάρχεινἐπιτηδείωςἔχουσαν).  Totheextentthatpoliticiansmakeuseofhumanbeingsastheirmaterial,theythus needtoknowsomenaturalscience.Itisonlybyknowingenoughofthebiologyof humanbeings(andsomeoftheirpsychology:see,forinstance,EN1.13.1102a18-26;  9 10.9.1181b12-15; andPol 7.13.1333a16-b5, esp. 1333a37) that the lawgiver will be abletochoosethemostsuitable'materials'andmakethebestuseofthem.17 For thePolitica as a treatise, this means that we should distinguishbetween twolayers:a'biological'layerpertainingtothenatural,constitutivematerialofcities (i.e., the human beings and the communities they form by nature, without interference of a lawgiver) and to which principles of the science of nature can properly be applied, and an 'ethical' or 'political' layer pertaining the constitutions andthelawgiverswhousehumanbeingsandtheirnaturalcommunitiestocreatethe kind of city that makes its inhabitants good, which is the proper domain of the scienceofpolitics.  TWOCITIES–ANDTWOTYPESOFTELEOLOGY  Thetwosciencesatplay inthePolitica accountforAristotle'sambivalent treatment ofthecity:therearetwostagesinthedevelopmentofcities,thefirstbeingentirely natural,butthesecondbeingaresultoftheartoflawgiving.IbelievethatAristotle saysasmuchinhisteleologicalexplanationofthecityinPol 1.2.1252b27-30:  Thecompletecommunityfrommultiplevillagesisthecity...whichcomesto beforthesakeof living,butexistsforthesakeofliving well (γινομένημὲν τοῦζῆνἕνεκεν,οὖσαδὲτοῦεὖζῆν.).  Inthispassage,Aristotledistinguishesbetween(a)twotypesofgoalsthatareserved bythecityandbetween(b)ageneticandastaticexplanationofthecity.Apparently, whatdrivesthecoming into beingofthecityistherealizationofthefunctionof living, presumably for all its inhabitants, including the women and slaves. This biological goalistheprimaryfunctionofthedevelopmentofthis'natural'city,18anditexplains why all humans are invested in its realization. However, what accounts for its continuedandstable existence is thefact that thecity (onceorganizedproperlybya lawgiver)makespossibletherealizationofthefunctionof living well –ifonlyto its freemalecitizens.Thisethicalgoalisthemostimportantandmostdefiningfunction of the city (see Pol 3.6.1278b15-31; 1287b23: μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος;   17 See also Pol 7.7.1327b18-1328a20, where Aristotle indicates that the lawgiver needs to have knowledgeofthecharacterofthecitizenshechoosesforhiscity,sincethosewhoarebothintelligent andcourageousintheirnaturewillbe"mosteasilyledtovirtue"(1327b36-38:εὐαγώγουςἔσεσθαι... πρὸςτὴνἀρετήν). Cf. the following passage from (ps-?)Aristotle'sProtrepticus (Iamblichus,Protrepticus X.54.12-55.3):'Forjustasallthesophisticateddoctorsandmostsophisticatedathletictrainerspretty muchagreethatthosewhoaretobegooddoctorsortrainersmustbeexperiencedaboutnature–and indeedmuchmorethantheformer...inthesameway,thestatesmanmusthavecertainnormstaken fromnature itself,i.e.,fromthetruth,byreferencetowhichtojudgewhatis justandwhat isgood and what is advantageous.' (I borrowed this translation from Hutchinson & Johnson 2005:263.) I thankMonteJohnsonforbringingthispassagetomyattention. 18Cf.Kullmann1991:102-103.  10 3.9.1280b29-1281a4), and is what the lawgiver has in view when he organizes the city.AsIshallexplaininmoredetailbelow,thetwogoals–andthetwostagesofthe city–formahierarchicalcontinuum,inwhichtheethicalrealmbuilds,asitwere,on thebiologicalone. Letmefirstspecifythecausalmechanismsthroughwhichthetwostagesof the city are realized: even though Aristotle is never terribly explicit about this, I believethatthelanguage heusesinthepassagequotedabovecharacterizesthenatural cityasaproductofnaturalteleology,buttheethicalcityasaproductofartimitating nature. Forinthebiologicalworks,Aristotledrawssimilarcontrastsbetweenfeatures that are for the sake of living versus thosethat are forthe sake of living well, and differentiatesbetweenthecausesofthecomingtobeandtheexistenceoffeatures only in a special type of case – distinctions an aspiring politician might well be assumed to be familiar with. In theDe Partibus Animalium, for instance, Aristotle characterizes the liver as a necessary condition for the living of an animal (PA 4.2.677a36-b5):  Foritisreasonablethat,sincethenatureoftheliverisvital(ἐπίκαιρον)and necessarytoallthebloodedanimals,itsbeingofacertaincharacterisacause of living a shorter or longer time (τοῦ ζῆν ἐλάττω ἢ πλείω χρόνον). ...and none of the other viscera [with the exception of the heart, of course] is necessarytotheseanimals,butonlytheliver.  TheliverisamongthepartsthatAristotleconsiderstobethenecessaryprerequisites fortherealizationofeithervitaloressentialfunctions:withoutthosepartstheanimal couldnotlive,orwouldnotbeabletobethekindofanimalitis.Suchpartsallcome to be and exist due to a process I call 'primary teleology': they are the necessary realizations of a pre-existing, internal potential for form, as specified by the definition of the substantial being of the animal. Because of their vital or essential importance to the animal, these parts come to be first during the process of embryogenesisandaregeneratedbythatform,orformalnature,throughconditional necessity:ifthereistobeananimalofthatform,itmust havetheseveryparts.Thus, ifthesubstantialbeingofananimalspecifiesthatitisblooded(seePA4.5.678a31-5, 4.12.693b2-13and4.13.695b17-26),itmusthavealiver. Other parts, however, such as kidneys (PA 3.7.670b23-7) and horns (PA 3.1.661b28-662a2) are not 'among the necessities for living' (see Aristotle's descriptionof limbs inPA 3.4.665b21-7;25-6:οὐκἔστιτῶνπρὸςτὸζῆνἀναγκαίων; cf.GA 1.4.717a12-31ontestes),butareratherpresentforthesakeof'thewelland thegood'or 'forthebetter'.Thesepartsareofasubsidiaryor 'luxury'nature:they contribute to the performance of functions already performed by other, necessary parts(e.g.,kidneyshelpthebladdercollectresidue,testesslowdowntheejaculation ofsementhroughtheducts),orperformfunctionsthatcontributetothewell-being oftheanimalwithoutbeingabsolutelynecessaryforitssurvivalorreproduction(e.g.,  11 horns provide protection – a function not mentioned in Aristotle's list of soulfunctionsinhisDeAnima).Hypotheticallyspeaking,theformalnatureoftheanimal couldhaverealizedallthevitalandessentialfunctionswithoutproducingsuchparts (which Aristotle believes is evidenced by the fact that there are indeed related animalsthatperformthosefunctionswithoutthepresenceoftherelevantsubsidiary parts),butwiththeseparts,theanimalisnotonlyabletolive,butalsotolivewell. Thecausalmechanismthroughwhichthesepartsareproducedisthatof'secondary teleology':thematerialsconstitutiveofthesepartscometobeasmateriallynecessary by-productsof theprimary teleological processes and arethenusedbythe animal's formalnaturefor('pros'or'charin' –Aristotleoftenuses'weaker'teleologicallanguage inthesecases)theproductionofpartsthatservetheanimal'swell-being.Thisisalso why Aristotle distinguishes between the causes of the coming to be of these parts, whichisusuallymaterialnecessity,andthecausesoftheirexistenceorpresence,whichis afinalcauseofthesubsidiaryor luxurykind.Theprocess is teleological (itarethe goal-directed actions ofthe formal nature in using thesematerials that account for the part's functional presence), but the function is imposed on the extra materials onlysecondarily totheir independentproductionand isrestrictedbythepotentials thosematerialsofnecessityhave. Aristotle lays the foundation for this distinction between features that are necessary for living and those that are subsidiary to living well in the 'biological chapters'attheendofDe Anima (chapters 3.11-13).There,Aristotleinvestigatesthe questionwhylivingbeingspossesstheprecisesequenceofnestedcapacities(forthe performanceofwhichanimalpartsformthenecessaryprerequisites)theyhave.He doesthisbydeterminingforeachcapacitywhetheritisnecessaryforaspecificway of living orbeingitself,orisratherforthesakeof livingwell orthe good (seeespecially DA 3.12.434a22-6,b10-18andb22-27; 3.13.435b19-21).Inthefirstcase,Aristotle believes that the realization of a certain capacity is of immediate vital or essential importanceforallthesubspecieswithinthesamewidestformoflifeasconsideredin De Anima, i.e., plants, non-human animals, and human beings. Without the possessionofandthemeanstorealizethatcapacity,thelivingbeingcouldnotatall have existed orhave been the specific kind of being it is. For instance, having the capacity of touch is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being an animal, and all animals therefore will have touch; without it, no animal can exist or could havebeenananimal inthefirstplace(DA 3.12.434b10-14;b22-24).Inthesecond case,whichpertainsonlytonon-humanandhumananimals,Aristotlebelievesthat thepossessionofandmeanstorealizethecapacityinquestionarenotofimmediate vitaloressentialimportanceforallanimals(andthereforenotnecessaryinthestrict sense). However, their realization does serve the well-being of some of them: the capacity seems to be present for the sake of optimizing their performance of the essentialandvitallifefunctions,ratherthanforthesakeoftheirbasicperformance. Forinstance,havingthecapacityofvoiceisnotnecessaryforallanimals(i.e.,nature could have'designed'thoseanimalstofunctionwithouttheabilitytoproducesounds;  12 and,asitturnsout,thereareinfactanimalsthatlackthiscapacity),butitispresent onlyinthosewhichtakeinair(DA 2.8.420b13-22).Sinceintheseanimalsbreathis already present forthe sake of cooling, nature canuse it for a subsidiary function, which is toexpresspainandpleasure(seePol 1.2.1253a8-18).Whereascooling is a necessaryfunction,beingabletocommunicatepainandpleasurecontributestothe well-beingoftheseanimals. Inbiology,thedistinctionbetweenthetwogoalsoflivingversuslivingwell thusoperatesatthelevelofsoul-capacitiesaswellasatthelevelofanimalparts.In bothcases,thegoaloflivingisrealizedwidely,whereasthegoaloflivingwellisonly realizedinthemorecomplexorganisms;andinbothcases,thefeaturesthatenable theanimaltolivewellpresupposetheexistenceofthefeaturesthatenableittolive. Inthisway,thedistinctiongivesrisetoascala naturae (PA 2.10.656a3-13;656a3-7):  Theanimalsthathaveperceptioninadditiontolifearemorepolymorphicin theirappearance,andsomeofthemmorethanothers,andthereisstillmore variability among those whose nature partakes not only of living but, in addition, of living well (ὅσων μὴμόνον τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰκαὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆνἡ φύσις μετείληφεν).Andsuchisthespeciesofhumans.  Atthebottomofthescalearethoselivingbeings,suchasplants,thatonlypossess capacities for basic survival and reproduction; at the top are the living beings that displayagreaterorganicandfunctionalcomplexity(inadditiontohavingallthebasic capacities) and that thus partake in a form of living well.19 Human beings, as a species,areat thetopofthisgradualscale: theyarethemostcomplexanimalsand possess the highest soul-capacity, which is thought. All humans, therefore, are capable of living as well as of living well in a biological sense, and – as Aristotle points out in a laterreference back tobook oneof thePolitica – bothof these are somethingevenanaturalcitycanprovidetoallitsinhabitants(Pol.3.6.1278b17-30):  Aswassaidinthefirstchapters...manisbynatureapoliticalanimal.And therefore, human beings, even when they do not require help from each other,nolessdesiretolivetogether...Buttheyalsocometogetherandhold together thepolitical community for the sake of life itself (τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ): for perhapsthereis somepartofthegoodpresentalsoinwhatisinaccordance only with living itself (ἴσωςγὰρἔνεστίτιτοῦκαλοῦμόριονκαὶκατὰτὸζῆναὐτὸ μόνον),aslongasthedifficultiespertainingtolifedonotoverbalanceittoo much.Foritisclearthatmanypeoplesteadfastlyclingtolife,eventhoughit bringsmanybadexperiences,because[theybelieve]thereissomefinenessin itandanaturalsweetness.    19SeealsoHA 8.1.588b4-22andPA 4.5.681a10-15.Cf.Lennox1999:6-7.  13 However,thehighest formoflivingwell,whichAristotledefinesaslivingahappyand virtuous life in accordance to reason (see, e.g.,NE 1.4.1095a17-20, 1.8.1098b20-22 and6.5.1140a24-28),isrestrictedtoaselectgroupofhumanbeings,namelytothose whopossessan 'authoritative'facultyofdeliberationand, inaddition,areeducated andhabituatedintherightway.Inotherwords,inordertolivewellin an ethical sense, onehastomeetspecificnaturalandculturalrequirements:onehastobeafree,male humanbeingbybirth(cf.Pol 7.13.1332a40-1)andbebroughtupwithintheconfines ofacitythathastherightkindofconstitution,organizationandeducationalsystem (EN 2.1.1103a30-b5 and 10.9.1179b29-1180a5; Pol 7.13.1332a41-b11). Although manyformsoflivingtogetherwillsufficeforthepreservationoflifeofallhumans, free males need an 'ethical city' if they want to live well. The ethical city thus performsasubsidiaryfunction inhelpingthisgroupofpeoplerealizingthehighest formofhumanhappinessandisstrictlyspeaking,onlyforthem(Pol 3.9.1280a31-4; 1280b39-81a4):  Ifthecityisnotonlyforthesakeoflife,butmoreforthesakeoflivingwell (εἰδὲμήτετοῦζῆνμόνονἕνεκενἀλλὰμᾶλλοντοῦεὖζῆν)–forifitdid[exist onlyforthesakeoflife]thenslavesandotheranimalscouldhaveacity;but infacttheycannot,becausetheydonotparticipateinhappinessorinthelife in accordance with choice ... The end of the city is living well, and these thingsareforitsend.Andthecityisthecommunityoffamiliesandvillages in a complete and self-sufficing life, and this is –as we call it – the life of happinessandgoodness.Itmustthusbepositedthatthepoliticalcommunity existsfornobleactions,butnotforlivingtogether.  Schematically,thelanguageAristotleuses inhischaracterizationofthetwoendsof thecitysuggeststhefollowinganalogies:   BASIC LEVEL (final cause is living/existing) COMPLEX LEVEL (final cause is living well/the good) Type of feature Necessary Beneficiary Subsidiary Beneficiary Biologicalpart Liver,bladder Allbloodedanimals Kidneys,horns Someanimals Soul-capacity Touch Allanimals Voice Someanimals Levelofcity Naturalcity All humans (incl. womenandslaves) Ethicalcity Somehumans (i.e.,allcitizens)  Thecausalmechanismsresponsibleforthetwocitiescanbesummedupasfollows. Just like all otherbiological features that arenecessary for living, Aristotle explains thecomingtobeofthenaturalcity'bottomup'–astheresultoftheformalnatures ofhumanbeingsrealizingtheirowninternal,pre-existingpotentialforform,which includes their political nature. The political community arises as an emergent property from the combined individual impulses of all human beings towards  14 survivalandreproduction(cf.Pol 1.2.1253a29-30).Itcanreachconsiderablelevelsof complexity20andprovideacomfortableleveloflivingtoallormany. However, inordertomakethiscommunityserviceabletothe livingwellof itsfreemalecitizensinanon-accidentalandreliableway,itneedstobeorganizedin anappropriateway.Thishappens'topdown',throughadeliberateapplicationofthe artoflawgiving:justastheinternalformalnaturesofbiologicalorganismsmakeuse ofthematerialsthatarenaturallyavailableforsomethinggood,sotoodolawgivers– asexternalgoal-directedagents–makeuseofthenaturallyavailablecityandinform it with a constitution (cf. Pol 1.10.1258a21-4, quoted above). And, just as the subsidiaryandluxurypartsmadefromextramaterialshelptheanimaltowhichthey belongto live well, so too does the ethical city –ormore precisely: the extra time (scholê) opened up for the pursuit of politics and philosophy21 – make a good life possibletothoseforwhomthisispossible.Theethicalcityisthusaproductofart, but of the kind of art that imitates the natural process of secondary teleology and thatistherefore'inaccordancetonature'(cf.Ps.-Arist.Econ1.2.1343a24-b1).22 The question of whether the city is a product of art or of nature thus presents a false dichotomy. The teleological explanations Aristotle gives in his accountofthecityindicatethatitisboth:thecityfirstcomesintobeingasaproduct ofnaturalteleology,butitsexistenceforthesakeoflivingwellisaproductoftheart of lawgiving in its imitation of the process of secondary teleology. The resulting ethical city, which is the proper objectof political science, is not arealization of a pre-existing,naturalpotential foracity-form(theformsofconstitutionsdifferand areimposedthroughtheexternalgoal-directedactionsofalawgiver).Thecitydoes nothaveaformthattranscendsthe individualformsof its inhabitants,nordoes it haveanature,evenifitis'bynature'becauseitsconstitutivematerialhascometobe naturally.23 WhenAristotlecomparesthecitytoanorganisminordertoshowitsnatural priority to its individual inhabitants (inPol 1.2.1253a18-22), he does not claim that the city is an organism: in fact, as Aristotle points out, if the plurality of parts of whichthecity iscomposedwouldreachthesamedegreeofunityas thepartsofa naturalbodypossess,thecitywouldbedestroyed(Pol 2.2,1261a15-22 ).24Instead,he claimsthatbotharefunctionally organized wholesconsistingofpartsthatcannotfunction   20 Think, for instance, of Athens before Solon, or of the way most barbarians live according to Aristotle,orevenofthehierarchicalsocialstructuresanddivisionsoflabourthatcanbefoundinbee hivesandantcolonies. 21 I thank Jim Hankinson for pointing out this analogy. For the importance of leisure, see Pol 2.9.1269a34-36;2.12,1273a31-b7;and7.9.1329a1-2. 22Theroleofthelawgiverisinthatsensenotthatmuchdifferentfromthatofthefarmer:although most crops grow and reproduce by nature (and can reach some level of excellence by nature or chance),aperfectandregularyieldcanonlybeattainedthroughtheartofagricultureasappliedbya farmerwhoknowshismaterialsandisabletomakeuseoftheavailabilityofrainduringthewinter. 23Cf.Wardy1993:25. 24Cf.Ferguson1985:263.  15 properlyindependentlyofthatwhole(cf.MA 10.703a29-36).Partsofanimals,when separatedfromtheanimal,arenolongerabletoperformtheirbiologicalfunction–a functionwhichisdefinedintermsofthecontributionthepartmakestothewhole. When this whole is destroyed, however, parts of animals do not evaporate out of existence, but exist merely 'as matter' and 'as a heap' (Meta 7.16.1040b5-10)25 and remain stripped oftheiroriginal identity. An eye is no longer an eye,but merely a heap of fluids and solids, referred to as an 'eye' only homonymously. Similarly, humanbeings,whenseparatedfromwhatmustbetheethicalcity(thisisrevealedby Aristotle's reference to self-sufficiency inPol 1.2.1253a26, which is the purpose of the ethical city; cf. Pol 3.9.1280b29-35), are no longer able to perform their civil function – they loose their self-sufficiency, which is necessary, not for living,26 but for living well. The natural priority Aristotle refers to thus entails the functional dependencyof theparts tothewholeofwhichtheyarepart:withoutthecity,human beings exist merely as 'unorganized' matter and can no longer to be identified as citizens(fortheidentificationofthecitizensaspartsofthecity,seePol 3.1.1274b3840) – they have lost the external conditions necessary for living a happy life (note thattheycanstillbecalled'humans'inanon-homonymousway).27Humansarenot like wild animals or gods (Pol 1.2.1253a27-9): unlike wild animals, humans are capableoflivingincommunitiesandneedtodosoforthesakeofliving,andunlike gods,humansneedtobepartsofsuchcommunitiesforthesakeofself-sufficiency andlivingwell. Insum,forAristotle,existing(successful)citiesareajointproductofhuman nature and political art. Humans form political communities by nature, but the applicationofpoliticalartisnecessarytotakethisbiologicalwayoflifeinsupportof self-preservation and reproduction to a level of complexity that allows the free citizenstoachievehappiness.     25Mayhew1997:327. 26Aristotle'sgeneticaccountofthecityandhisdescriptionofthemoraldownfallofapersonwhois separatedfromthelawsofthecityinPol 1.2,1253a31-7makeitclearenoughthathumanbeingscan survivewithoutcities.SeeKraut2002:256-257,especiallyn.20,andReeve2009:515. 27 For humans (but not for parts of a body) it makes a huge difference whether or not they are separatedfromtheethicalcity as agrouporby themselves.Anyhumanseparatedasan individual fromtheethicalcitywillenduploosingatleastpartofwhatmakeshimhumanifheisalsonolonger part of a natural city: a political animal needs to be with others – however few – to realize his particularwayoflife.Ifseparatedfromtheethicalcityasagroup,ontheotherhand,humanscanstill form a natural community (and attain a natural level of organization) that allows them to live and realize their political way of life. For this group of humans, the citizens among them suffer the greatestloss:theybecome'mere'humansandloosetheircapacitytoliveahappylife,whereasforthe women and slaves among them nothing much may change (if separated from their husbands and masters,theywillloosethebenefitofbeingruled,butsincetheycouldneverbecometrulyhappyin thefirstplace,thismaybeconsideredtobeaminorloss).IthankLarryJostforpressingmetodraw outtheanalogyinamorepreciseandnuancedway.  16 CONCLUDINGREMARKS  BuildingonAristotle'suseofteleologyinthePolitics,Ihavearguedthathisconcept ofthecityaswellasthetreatiseinwhichhepresentsthisconcept arehybridentities. Thecitythatcomestobeforthesakeofliving,andthatdoessoundertheinfluence of the natural inclinations and tendencies all human beings have, is the object of naturalscience.Thecitythatexistsforthesakeoflivingwellandthatisestablished by the lawgiver who uses the natural city as his material is the object of political science. The Politica is mostly concerned with the latter, i.e., the ethical city, and thereforeforms,togetherwiththeethicaltreatises,mostlyastudyinpoliticalscience. However, where the 'matter'of the ethical city is at stake, Aristotle (as should the lawgiver) approaches the inhabitants of the city as biological entities, and uses principles that belong properly to the science of nature: the Politica also involves discussions that are at home in the study of nature. This in turn provides an interesting perspective on the relation between the natural and the ethical realm: althoughtheethicalcityisontologicallydependentonthepriorcomingintobeingof thenaturalcity,italsoprovidestheonlymeansforaselectgroupofhumanbeingsto perfecttheirnature,andtoliveahappylife.Naturalteleologyandpoliticalartcome togetherinproducingsuccessfulcitiesinwhichallcanlive,andsomecanlivewell.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Cooper,J.(1990)'PoliticalAnimalsandcivicFriendship',inAristoteles Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum,ed.GüntherPatzig.Göttingen:221-241.  Depew,D.J.(1995)'HumansandotherpoliticalAnimalsinAristotle'sHistory of Animals'Phronêsis 40:156-181.  Ferguson,J.(1985)'TeleologyinAristotle'sPolitics',inAristotle on Nature and Living Things (Philosophical and Historical Studies Presented to David M. Balme on his Seventieth Birthday),ed.A.Gotthelf.Pittsburgh&Bristol:258-273.  Gotthelf, A. (1987) 'Aristotle's conception of final Causality', reprinted with additional Notes and a Postscript inPhilosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, eds. A. Gotthelf&J.G.Lennox.Cambridge:204-242.  Johnson, M. R. & D. S. Hutchinson (2005) 'Authenticating Aristotle's Protrepticus' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy29:193-294.  Keyt, D. (1991) 'Three basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics', in A companion to Aristotle's Politics,eds.D.Keyt&F.D.Miller,Jr.Oxford:118-141.   17 Kraut,R.(2002)Aristotle: Political PhilosophyOxford.  Kullmann, W. (1991) 'Man as political Animal in Aristotle', in A companion to Aristotle's Politics,eds.D.Keyt&F.D.Miller,Jr.Oxford:94-117.  Lennox,J.G.(1999)'ThePlaceofMankindinAristotle'sZoology'Philosophical Topics 27:1-16.  (2001) Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology, Studies in the Origins of Life Science Cambridge.  (2006) 'Aristotle's Biology and Aristotle's Philosophy', in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Series) eds. M. L. Gill & P. Pellegrin.London:292-315.  Leunissen, M. (2009) 'Why Stars have no Feet. Teleological Explanations in Aristotle'sCosmology',inNew Perspectives on Aristotle's De Caeloeds.A.C.Bowen&C. Wildberg.Leiden:245-271.  (2010 a)Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature Cambridge.   (2010b)'NatureasaGoodHousekeeper.SecondaryTeleologyandMaterial NecessityinAristotle'sBiology'Apeiron 43.4, 117-142.  Lloyd,G.E.R.(1996)'TheIdeaofNatureinthePolitics', inAristotelian Explorations G.E.R.Lloyd.Cambridge:184-204.  Mayhew,R.(1997)'PartandWholeinAristotle'sPoliticalPhilosophy'The Journal of Ethics 1:325-340.  Reeve,C.D.C.(2009)'TheNaturalnessofthePolisinAristotle',inA Companion to Aristotle (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Series) ed.G.Anagnostopoulos.Malden& Oxford:512-525.  Sedley,D.(1991)'IsAristotle'sTeleologyanthropocentric?'Phronêsis36:179-197.  VanderEijk,Ph.J.(1997)'TheMatterofMind:AristotleontheBiologyof'psychic' Processes',inAristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisseeds.W.Kullmann& S.Föllinger.Stuttgart:231-258.  Wardy,R.(1993)'AristotelianRainfallortheLoreofAverages'Phronêsis38:18-30. Filename: BiologyandteleologyinAristotle'saccountofthecity(July1, 2011) Directory: C:\MyDocuments\MyDocuments\New Projects\Done\BiologyandTeleologyinPolitics Template: C:\Users\Mariska Leunissen\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dot Title: ThebiologicalunderpinningsofAristotle'snotionof happiness Subject:  Author: MariskaLeunissen Keywords:  Comments:  CreationDate: 7/1/201111:33:00AM ChangeNumber: 2 LastSavedOn: 7/1/201111:33:00AM LastSavedBy: MariskaLeunissen TotalEditingTime: 0Minutes LastPrintedOn: 7/1/201111:39:00AM AsofLastCompletePrinting  NumberofPages: 17  NumberofWords:6,664(approx.)  NumberofCharacters: 37,989(approx.) 